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I. INTRODUCTION
Victims deserve remedy for harm suffered. The logic of ubi jus ibi
remedium should position victims as recipients and beneficiaries of
available remedies. This is especially true because the notion of "a victim"
is firmly established within international law theory and jurisprudence.
Additionally, states by virtue of international human rights instruments
undertake to provide remedies to victims. Alternatively, arguably such
an obligation is automatically created if any international legal obligation
has been breached. Development of human rights and new trends in
accepting the international personality, in general, and of individuals in
particular provides support for the idea that victims have been increasingly
fostered within international and national legal arenas.
The aim of this Article is to examine such developments and the
current availability of remedies for human rights violations in general.
The Author will also examine the appropriateness of such remedies and
opportunities to pursue them. The Article starts by identifying remedies
in international law. This is followed by a case study and analysis of
attempts by several national judiciaries to grapple with remedies
prescribed by international law, against the background of international
and national remedies. In the course of examining the reasons for an
inadequate remedial structure, the Article will focus on several national
cases. They will illustrate both objective and false dilemmas which
national courts face when implementing the law of remedies for victims
of international law violations.
II. REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Four-fold Structure of Remedies in International Law
It might be prudent to start the analysis of remedies available to
victims of breaches of human rights norms with preliminary, or rather
precautionary, terminology clarifications of the term "remedy." The
legal term "remedy" in English denotes two different, though not entirely
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separate, legal concepts.' Remedy can denote a procedural device by
which a person can initiate or further a formal proceeding before a
competent body-a legal action which can be brought before a court.
The remedy used in this sense can be termed a "procedural remedy."
The other meaning refers to a measure the purpose of which is to undo
the wrongfulness and illegality. These remedial measures usually
comprise specific performance, restitution, compensation, prohibition of
repetition of illegal conduct, and so forth. The remedy used in the latter
sense will be referred to as a "substantive remedy." The difference in
meanings is not only relevant for delineating different legal concepts, but
also because it is exactly the term "remedy" which acquires different
meanings 2 when crossing the international-national barrier.3 The general
domestic setting of remedies addresses types of remedies available:
specific performance, money damages, injunctions and the like. Whereas
the international notion of domestic remedies usually refers to national
formal legal proceedings suitable for obtaining redress before turning to
international fora.
Additional categorization is needed when referring to international and
domestic remedies, both procedural and substantive. Generally speaking,
international substantive remedies are measures tailored to undo the
harm done to those who possess international personality and a recognized
legal interest to request the remedy. International procedural remedies
are international legal actions available to states or persons.4 International
1. Christian Tomuschat, Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations,
10 TuL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 157, 168 (2002) ("In English, the word 'remedy' has a two-
fold meaning. On the one hand it connotes a legal action which can be brought before a
judicial or other body entitled to settle the dispute concerned; or it could mean a measure
designed to make good for damages caused.").
2. Eckart Klein, Individual Reparation Claims under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: The Practice of the Human Rights Committee, in STATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: REPARATION IN INSTANCES OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 27, 33 (Albrecht Randelzhofer & Christian Tomuschat eds., 1999)
("While the English legal term remedy would cover not only the procedural right but also
redress and reparation, a similarly broad meaning could not be given to the French term
recours.").
3. RENI PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 43
(2002) ("Whether internal or international remedies are created will depend not only on
the specific requirements of human rights and humanitarian law, but also on the manner
in which these norms are incorporated into municipal law.").
4. Other functions may also be ascribed to international remedies. In the opinion
of Dinah Shelton, "International remedies serve an additional purpose. In the absence of
a collective sanctioning or enforcement authority, the injured party claiming reparations
scholarship provides a basis for this four-fold remedial structure, 5 which
can be further broken down with respect to judicial and non-judicial
remedies.
This four-fold classification leaves each category standing in its own
right. However, in order to assess the right a victim has to a remedy,
each segment of the remedial structure needs to be defined before it can
be determined whether a victim may transfer himself from one level to
another. As this Article will show, such a transfer is possible only if
explicitly provided for, either by international or national law. If that is
the case, each remedial structure needs precise definition and demarcation.
All four connotations of remedies are usually employed throughout
human rights conventions without specific reference to meanings or
possible contexts in which they might be used.
Decomposition of the remedial structure, resulting from separation
and incoherence of international and national remedies and obscurity of
its contents, has been at odds with the relevance of remedies, both for
victims and states, as well as with the catalog of remedies as offered by
U.N. bodies. Whereas for individuals the clear and complete remedial
structure ensures the fullest satisfaction possible for the breach of their
rights and the closure of the case, for states, remedies are part of
international obligations and therefore may presumably be grounds for
their international responsibility.6 In terms of general language of
international law, when a state breaches a primary obligation to respect
and ensure human rights, it triggers a secondary duty to make reparations
which arise from the same legal source.7 Also, the state's remedial task
is to establish the equilibrium as it existed before the breach occurred.
However, the choice of remedy, or the content of the secondary rules on
remedies, may considerably vary in terms of range and intrusiveness: "In
the range of remedies, relatively non-intrusive remedies, such as declaratory
judgments and damages, may give way to injunctions, prohibitions and
affirmative orders.",8 The catalog of remedies available depends on the
rights breached but even more so on the developing concept of human
acts to uphold the public interest or legal order by punishing and deterring wrong-doing."
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 45 (1999).
5. See, e.g., PROVOST, supra note 3, at 43 ("The existence of an international right
to a remedy does not necessarily lead to a corresponding right to an international
remedy. Remedies may be internal as well as international, the latter usually playing a
role complementary to the former.").
6. SHELTON, supra note 4, at 38 ("Yet the aim of remedies, to vindicate interests
that have been injured, requires that human rights law, representing fundamental
interests, develop not only a primary theory of what duties are owed, but a secondary
theory of what duties exist when a primary duty is violated.").
7. Tomuschat, supra note 1, at 158.
8. SHELTON, supra note 4, at 55.
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rights remedies and international law remedies, which tend to extend this
catalog to its utmost limits.
B. European Human Rights System
The European human rights system evidences both the decomposition
of the remedial structure and its evolution. The European Convention on
Human Rights9 (ECHR) refers to remedies in Articles 1310 and 35" but
with different meanings and in different contexts. Article 13 is a
substantive human right, which provides for an "effective remedy before
a national authority." However, Article 35, which deals with the exhaustion
of domestic remedies, refers to procedural remedies. Other substantive
remedial forms are also referred to in Articles 5(5)2 and 41, 3 as
well as in Articles 3 and 4 of Protocol 7.14 Article 5(5) explicitly
9. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 41, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights] (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
10. Id. art. 13 ("Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.").
11. Id. art. 35 ("The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final
decision was taken.").
12. Id. art. 5(5) ("Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in
contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.").
13. Id. art. 41 ("If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention
or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned
allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
satisfaction to the injured party.").
14. Protocol 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117 ("When a person has by a
final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his
conviction has been reversed, or he has been pardoned, on the ground that a new or
newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage ofjustice, the
person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated
according to the law or the practice of the State concerned, unless it is proved that the
non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him."); id.
art. 4 ("1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings
under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been
finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that
State. 2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the
case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is
evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in
the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 3. No derogation
from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention.").
envisages compensation as a domestic substantive remedy for illegal arrest
or detention, and in a similar fashion, Article 3 of Protocol 7 provides
for compensation in cases of a reversed criminal conviction. Article 4 of
Protocol 7 provides for the possibility of reopening the case following a
fundamental defect during the criminal proceeding. On the other hand,
Article 41 entrusts the European Court of Human Rights with jurisdiction to
award international substantive remedies in the form of "just satisfaction" if
the finding of violation by the Court was not followed by adequate
national substantive remedy.
Therefore, the European Court of Human Rights has had to further
develop the doctrines of effective remedy and just satisfaction in order to
close the gap in the ECHR. These doctrines have undergone a considerable
evolution. For almost thirty years, the Court has refrained from ordering
specific measures under the just satisfaction clause, limiting itself to
declaratory and pecuniary judgments. 15 The Court has also cautiously
approached pecuniary judgments, and the first time the Court awarded
pecuniary damages under the just satisfaction provision was in the
Ringeisen case' 6 in 1972. However, under the new system the Court has
begun interpreting the just satisfaction clause so as to include the whole
set of remedial measures ranging from preventive to restorative, from
declaratory to specific performance measures.
As to the term just satisfaction in Article 4l,17 the Court seems to have
interpreted this provision as incorporating both pecuniary damages,
usually awarded under the Article, and other remedial measures:
It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a breach imposes
on the respondent state a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the
sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to
supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate,
individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to
the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects.
Furthermore, subject to monitoring by the Committee of Ministers, the respondent
state remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal
obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are
compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's judgment. 18
15. See generally, SHELTON, supra note 4, at 154-58.
16. See generally, Ringeisen v. Austria, 1 Eur. H.R. Rpt. 504 (1972) (awarding
just satisfaction for the non-material damage arising from the violation, whereas claims
for compensation of material damage indirectly resulting from the breach were rejected.
In its first compensation case, the Court awarded 20,000 DM).
17. This article was formerly Article 50. Numeration of articles in the ECHR was
changed after adoption of Protocol No. 11, Protocol 11 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May, 11 1994, Europ. T.S. No.
155. (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998), as from the date of its entry into force on 1
November 1998.
18. Scozzari v. Italy, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 473, 528 (citation omitted).
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In the context of international substantive remedies, Member States foster
the just satisfaction clause in Article 41 because of their general obligation
to enforce and implement judgments in cases to which they are parties.
This obligation comes from Article 46 and has been expanded by the
Committee of Ministers' Recommendation on the Re-Examination or
Reopening of Certain Cases at Domestic Level Following Judgments of
the European Court of Human Rights.19 The just satisfaction clause in
Article 41, as well as the Court's endorsement of any remedy it finds
appropriate despite the silence of the Convention on the matter, have
been linked to Article 46 by the Committee of Minister in the following
manner:
Noting that under Article 46 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ('the Convention') the Contracting Parties have accepted the
obligation to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights ('the Court') in any case to which they are parties and that the
Committee of Ministers shall supervise its execution; Bearing in mind that in
certain circumstances the above-mentioned obligation may entail the adoption
of measures, other than just satisfaction awarded by the Court in accordance
with Article 41 of the Convention and/or general measures, which ensure that
the injured party is put, as far as possible, in the same situation as he or she
enjoyed prior to the violation of the Convention (restitutio in integrum).20
The conclusions of the Committee of Ministers rely on the general rules
of remedies in international law as between the states, especially with
respect to the concept of restitution.
21
The European Court of Human Rights clearly defines the obligations
to be enforced by the respondent state: parliamentary legislation,
executive regulations; amendments to jurisprudence; construction of
prisons; dissemination of rules; and so forth.22 The variety of measures
that may be employed by different state agencies include the expedition
19. Eur. Consult. Ass., Recommendation of the Comm. of Ministers on the Re-
Examination or Reopening of Certain Cases at Domesticl Level Following Judgments of
the European Court of Human Rights, 109th Sess., Doc. No. R (2000) 2 (2000), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/humanrights/execution/02_Documents/Rec2000_2.asp.
20. Id. (parentheses omitted).
21. Int'l L. Comm'n, Work of its Fifty-Third Session, art. 35, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (July 26, 2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 26,28, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/200l/Add.1 (Part 2), available at http:/umtreaty.un.org/
ilc/pubications/yearbooks!Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC 2001v2 p2_e.pdf (stating restitution, restitutio
in integrum, is the measure designed to "to re-establish the situation which existed before
the wrongful act was committed").
22. Eur. Consult. Ass., General Measures Adopted to Prevent New Violations of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 960th Mtg., Doc. No. H/Exec (2006)1, (2006),
available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human rights/execution/HExec(2006) lGM_960e.doc.
or conclusion of pending proceedings; reinstatement of the applicant's
rights; issuance of official statements by the Government on the applicant's
innocence; modification of sentences by administrative measures, such
as pardon, clemency, or non-execution of a judgment; the use of measures
concerning restitution of, access to, or use of property; measures concerning
the adaptation of proceedings; modification of criminal records or other
official registers; special refunds; reopening of domestic proceedings;
measures regarding the right to residence such as having the right granted or
reinstated or non-execution of an expulsion measure; and employing
other special measures such as having pictures destroyed or having
meetings organized between parents and children.23
With respect to the obligation to provide national remedies, the Court
has also considerably developed the concept of effective remedy before
national authority in Article 13. The Court examines national remedies
on two levels: (1) whether there are remedies established within national
legal systems, i.e. whether remedies as such exist;24 and (2) whether
these remedies were applied in concreto.25 Under Article 13, the states
are expected to make a remedy available at the national level
to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever
form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of
this Article is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the
competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant
Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting
States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to
their obligations under this provision.
26
23. Eur. Consult. Ass., Individual Measures Adopted to Prevent New Violations of
the European Convention on Human Rights, 960th Mtg., Doc. No. H/Exec (2006)2, (2006),
available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human-rights/execution/HExec(2006)2_IM_960e.doc.
24. Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 347, 383 (1983) ("In the Court's
view, to the extent that the applicable norms, whether contained in the Rules or in the
relevant Orders or Instructions, were incompatible with the Convention there could be no
effective remedy as required by Article 13 and consequently there has been a violation of
that Article."). It is worth noting that in the subsequent proceeding initiated under
Article 50 of the Convention, now Article 41, the Court refused to award damages for
the violation of the right to effective remedy, thereby implicitly finding that the violation
of the right to remedy does not require remedy other that the declaratory judgment. The
Court relied on the phrase "if necessary" in the just satisfaction clause of Article 50. See
Silver v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 582, 582, 584 (1991).
25. See generally Klass v. Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 214, 237-41 (1978)
(finding no violation of Article 13).
26. Aydin v. Turkey, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866, 1895-97 (finding Turkish
investigation procedures violated Article 13). See also, e.g., Sod v. Croatia, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
App. No. 47863/99, paras. 113-17 (2003) (finding an Article 13 violation) (publication not yet
received), available at http:/Avww.iussoftware.si/ELfH/EUCHR/dokumenti/2003/05/CASE OF
SOC v. CROATIA 09 05 2003.html; Doran v. Ireland, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 17-21
(finding Article 13 violated by Irish remedial measures).
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In addition, in 2004 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, which monitors the enforcement of condemnatory decisions of
the Court, adopted the Recommendation on the Improvement of Domestic
Remedies.27 In that document, they discerned several types of remedies:
general and specific remedies, remedies following the pilot judgments28
in which deficiencies of national legislative act have been established,
and remedies against unreasonably lengthy proceedings-which, in the
opinion of the Committee, should lead to more lenient sentencing in
criminal cases. This untraditional and yet practical classification of
remedies represents the interpretation of the effective remedy standard
set out in Article 13, or interpretation of a substantive national remedy.
The Recommendation further stated that remedies are problem-solving
methods applied by a national authority and that these authorities do not
necessarily have to be judicial authorities. The Committee, however,
presumes that this interpretation does not infringe on the guarantee to the
right to court as envisaged in Article 6(1) of the Convention.
On the other hand, the limits on Article 13 lie in its auxiliary and
accessory character. Articles 13, 14, 15(2) and 18 of the ECHR provide
an additional guarantee for the enjoyment of rights and freedoms only in
connection with other complaints.29 As authors Van Dijk and Van Hoof
27. Eur. Consult. Ass., Recommendation of the Comm. of Ministers to Member
States on the Improvement of Domestic Remedies, paras. 9-23, 144th Sess., Doc. No. R
(2004) 6 (2004), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=743317&BackColor
Intemet=9999CC&BackColorlntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75#.
28. The "pilot judgment" procedure was introduced as the result of the reform of
the European human rights system following the adoption of Protocol 14 to the ECHR in
order to deal with so-called cloned cases. The pilot judgment procedure represents the
ECHR's concept of "class action" since the violation is the result of legislative or
executive action which is not in conformity with the European Convention. In order to
avoid the whole string of cases dealing with the same issue, the ECHR will address the
issue using the pilot judgment procedure.
29. Klass, 2 Eur. H.R. Rpt. at 238 ("Article 13 states that any individual whose
Convention rights and freedoms 'are violated' is to have an effective remedy before a
national authority even where 'the violation has been committed' by persons in an
official capacity. This provision, read literally, seems to say that a person is entitled to a
national remedy only if a 'violation' has occurred. However, a person cannot establish a
'violation' before a national authority unless he is first able to lodge with such an
authority a complaint to that effect. Consequently, as the minority in the Commission
stated, it cannot be a prerequisite for the application of Article 13 that the Convention be
in fact violated. In the Court's view, Article 13 requires that where an individual
considers himself to have been prejudiced by a measure allegedly in breach of the
Convention, he should have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have
his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress. Thus, Article 13 must be
interpreted as guaranteeing an 'effective remedy before a national authority' to everyone
Victims and Promise of Remedies[VOL. 9: 329, 2008]
point out, the status of Article 13 is "an odd one" because of its ancillary
character and casuistry which underrate its effect.30 Still, some authors,
like Frowein, find Article 13 to be one of the most important guarantees
and state that it is the provision that enabled the national enforcement of
the Convention.3'
The Court has interpreted obscure provisions of the Convention in
many ways. These interpretations have embraced the whole range of
measures imposed under Article 41 in connection with Article 46. The
Court has ordered general and individual measures, other than compensation,
by incorporating such measures into the operative part of its judgments.
In contrast to the Court's early decisions and the wording of the
Convention,32 the new remedial policies create a difficult task for national
authorities. This approach may represent progress for human rights law.
However, it may also leave national authorities in an uncomfortable
position. Apart from compensation and just satisfaction, no other remedy is
mentioned in the text of the ECHR. Therefore, states and national courts
may be unaware of the other possible remedies which may be required
of them. Given the variety of national remedies expected and international
remedies awarded, the position of national authorities could be quite
difficult in dealing with both pre-litigation remedies, Article 13, and
post-litigation remedies, Article 41.
who claims that his rights and freedoms under the Convention have been violated."
(quoting European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 13)). In later practice
the Court used the term "arguable claim" which is sufficient to trigger the application of
Article 13. See, e.g., Silver, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 381; Kaya v. Turkey, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep.
1, 50-51 (1999).
30. P. VAN DIJK ET. AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 697 (3d ed. 1998).
31. Jochen Frowein, Article 13 as a Growing Pillar of Convention Law, in PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, STUDIES IN MEMORY OF ROLv RYSSDAL
545, 545 (Paul Mahoney et al. eds., 2000).
32. Tomuschat, supra note 1, at 163-64 ("[T]he European Court of Human Rights
has recently made a number of considerable strides forward. The court had held for
many years that its powers were limited to granting financial compensation in appropriate
cases. However, it did not feel empowered to order the taking of measures seeking to
undo harm caused. This cautiousness could put the court in a terrible dilemma in cases
where an unlawful situation persisted during the relevant court proceeding....
Acknowledging the inadequacies of its jurisprudence, the European Court of Human
Rights embarked on a new course in 1995.").
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C. Human Rights Committee and ICCPR
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 33
and the Human Rights Committee (HRC) 34 have guaranteed similar
remedies and had similar jurisprudence in interpreting measures for
redress as the European system. Article 2(3) 35 of the ICCPR provides for
a substantive remedy in Article 2(3a) and a procedural national remedy in
Article 2(3b). Similarly, Article 9(5) of the ICCPR explicitly guarantees an
enforceable right to compensation in cases of unlawful detention 36 in the
same manner as Article 5(5) of the ECHR. Article 14(5)(6) of the
ICCPR provides for compensation for and revision of an unlawful
criminal conviction. The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR further guarantees
an international procedural remedy to individuals in Article 1. However,
an international substantive remedy, as fashioned in Article 41 of the
ECHR, cannot be found in the text of the Protocol. Still, the Human
Rights Committee has made consequential orders within remedies and
has made decisions granting not only compensatory monetary remedies
but also injunctions, prohibitions, and orders for specific performance.
33. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI),
at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
34. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), or ICCPR Committee, was created by
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The organization and functions
of the HRC are regulated by Articles 28-45 of the ICCPR as well as by the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), at 59, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). The
committee's jurisdiction covers three types of procedures: states reporting procedures,
interstate applications, and individual applications. Interstate applications are permitted
provided states have accepted HRC jurisdiction in accordance with Article 41 of the
ICCPR. Individual applications are permitted provided a respondent state has acceded to
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
35. ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 2(3) ("Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person
claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for
by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy; (c)
To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.").
36. ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 9(5) ("Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable fight to compensation.").
339
This evolution is quite similar to that of the ECHR. However, with the
HRC, there have been no amendments to its treaties, nor has there been
the creation of an explicit provision giving the Committee jurisdiction to
grant international substantive remedies. The HRC has relied instead on
Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, and, more interestingly, on Article
2(3) of the LCCPR.37
In awarding remedies, the HRC specifies the international obligation
that has been breached by a state before the case is brought before the
Committee. Bringing together national and international substantive
remedies, the HRC has expanded its jurisdiction by virtue of Article 2(3)
of the ICCPR. It has thereby established special significance for this
provision as a ground for awarding international substantive remedies.
The HRC applies these remedies proprio motu.38 Following the trend of
the European Court of Human Rights, the HRC also has embraced a number
of specific remedial measures to be undertaken in cases of violations of
the Covenant.39 The practice was recently confirmed by the HRC in its
General Comment no. 31 (2004):
Accordingly, it has been a frequent practice of the Committee in cases under the
Optional Protocol to include in its Views the need for measures, beyond a
victim-specific remedy, to be taken to avoid recurrence of the type of violation
in question. Such measures may require changes in the State Party's laws or
practices. 40
37. Klein defends this approach of the Committee by the lack of explicit prohibition for
the Committee to order remedies in the Optional Protocol. See Klein, supra note 2, at 32
("As far as the jurisdictional competence of the Human Rights Committee is concerned,
the wording of the Optional Protocol, Article 5 injuncto Article 1, might suggest that the
Committee has to confine itself to a finding as to whether the author of a communication
is the victim of a violation of a right set forth in the Covenant. However, the quoted
articles are far from clear. They do not state that the Committee is prevented from also
expressing its view on the conclusions which should be drawn from the violation.")
(footnotes omitted).
38. Id. ("While the first views have drawn their conclusions from the human rights
violations without referring to any provision, the following views quote Article 2, para.
3, and later on, still more precisely, Article 2, para. 3(a). This is, today, a persistent
pattern. The Committee develops from this provision the individual claims for reparation
in all their variety.").
39. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 928/2000, Boodlal
Sooklal v. Trinidad & Tobago, 6, U.N. Doc. A/57/40, CCPR/C/73/D/928/2000) (Oct. 25,
2001) ("Pursuant to article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the author is entitled to an
effective remedy entailing compensation and the opportunity to lodge a new appeal, or
should this no longer be possible, to due consideration of granting him early release.
The State party is under an obligation to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the
future. If the corporal punishment imposed on the author has not been executed, the
State party is under an obligation not to execute the sentence.").
40. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, 17, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004).
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Standard practice of the HRC can be illustrated by its actions in the
Bodroii6 v. Serbia case.4' In that case, the HRC found a violation of
Article 19 of the ICCPR because the criminal conviction and damages
the national courts of Serbia issued against the applicant amounted to
infringement of the right to expression. The HRC held,
In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is
under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including
quashing of the conviction, restitution of the fine imposed on and paid by the
author as well as restitution of court expenses paid by him, and compensation
for the breach of his Covenant right.
4 2
Through this example, we can see that the HRC's general practice is to
order a set of different remedial measures. Additionally, non-compliance
with these measures may amount to continuing violation of the Covenant.
As the Committee itself recognized,
In addition to the explicit reparation required by articles 9, paragraph 5, and 14,
paragraph 6, the Committee considers that the Covenant generally entails
appropriate compensation. The Committee notes that, where appropriate, reparation
can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as
public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in
relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of
human rights violations. 43
D. Committee Against Torture and U.N. Convention Against Torture
Another avenue for an individual to seek redress is through the Committee
Against Torture and the U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT). The
competency of the Committee Against Torture in issuing adequate remedies
has been prescribed in the U.N. Convention Against Torture. Unlike
human rights treaties of a more general character, the CAT focuses
exclusively on the prohibition of torture, namely, inhuman and degrading
treatment, and has developed precise obligations and remedies. Unlike
other human rights treaties, CAT provides for quite specific and clear
national substantive and procedural remedies. Apart from Article 2 of
the CAT, which is more general in nature, and Articles 4 to 7 thereof
containing specific obligation for member states, Articles 12 to 14
clearly outline the character and type of national remedies that are
41. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1180/2003, Bodro;ie v.
Serbia & Montenegro, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/I1 180/2003 (Oct. 31, 2005).
42. Id. at 9.
43. General Comment No. 31, supra note 40, at $ 16.
obligations of a state under whose jurisdiction an alleged act of torture
has occurred. National remedies are clearly structured: on the one hand
there are procedural national remedies, the obligation to conduct a
prompt and impartial investigation 44 and the right to complain before
competent authorities, 45 and on the other hand, there are substantive
national remedies, the right to redress and an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation.46 Other specific obligations are located in
other provisions of the CAT, e.g. the right to contact the nearest appropriate
representative of the State.47 The Committee proceeds upon individual
applications pursuant to Article 22, and its jurisdiction to issue
remedies may only be found in paragraph 7 of this Article. 8 Further, the
right to initiate the investigative inquiry on the territory of the member
state represents a unique international procedural remedy. It may be
launched by the Committee proprio motu in accordance with Article 20
provided that the conditions set out in Article 28 have been met.
The jurisdiction to order remedies for victims is more firmly
embedded in the Convention Against Torture through Articles 12 to 14
than in the ICCPR. As such, the Committee Against Torture has clear
authority. Moreover, it seems that the Committee Against Torture has
quite modestly followed the trend of expanding remedies and stayed
reasonably within the clear wording of the Convention. This is illustrated by
the decision of the Committee Against Torture in Risti6 v. Yugoslavia.49
44. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 12, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter CAT] ("Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed
to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe
that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.").
45. CAT, supra note 44, art. 13 ("Each State Party shall ensure that any individual
who alleges he has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the
right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its
competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that the complainant and witnesses
are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his complaint
or any evidence given.").
46. CAT, supra note 44, art. 14 ("1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal
system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to
fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his
dependants shall be entitled to compensation.").
47. Art. 6(3) of the CAT provides: "Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1
of this article shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest
appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national, or, if he is a stateless
person, to the representative of the State where he usually resides." CAT, supra note 44,
art. 6(3).
48. Art. 22(7) of the CAT reads: "The Committee shall forward its views to the
State Party concerned and to the individual." CAT, supra note 44, art. 22(7).
49. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Comm. No. 113/1998, Risti5 v. Yugoslavia, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/26/D/1 13/ 1998 (2001), (May 11, 2001) [hereinafter Ristid], available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/decisions/yugoslavial998.html.
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In that case, the applicant complained of the failure of the State to
investigate the death of his son which occurred under controversial
circumstances. National authorities found it was a clear case of suicide
despite erroneous and contradicting forensic reports. Because national
authorities failed to launch an adequate formal investigation, the applicant
was thus effectively prevented from exercising any right to remedy
envisaged in the Convention. The Committee concluded that the respondent
state violated its obligations under articles 12 and 13 to promptly and
effectively investigate allegations of torture or severe police brutality. As
for the substantive remedies regarding redress and compensation, the
Committee refused to award damages on the basis of Article 14; it was
not clear whether the rights of the alleged victim or his family had been
violated because a proper criminal investigation has not been carried out.
Therefore, the Committee was reluctant to award moral damages for
violations of substantive obligations arising from the Convention-in
this case, Articles 12 and 13-without substantiating allegations of the
victim on the national level.
The different approaches of the Committee Against Torture from the
European Court on Human Rights and the HRC with regard to international
remedies can be explained by two distinctive features of CAT. First, the
Convention establishes a number of substantive remedies that require member
states to implement standards within their national jurisdictions. 50 This
gives the Committee enough space to comfortably assess the adequacy
of remedies. Second, the Committee itself may initiate investigative
proceedings ex officio in order to inquire into the allegations of torture.
Still, it is worth noting that the Committee Against Torture has not
followed the trend of other human rights bodies in expanding the catalog
of remedies; the Committee's views on remedies have embraced nothing
but what is explicitly mentioned in the Convention, and they have shown
restraint with respect to remedies.
50. For more information regarding the structure and principal aims of the CAT
with respect to substantive obligations and remedies, see J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS
DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT 1-4 (1998); Leland H. Kynes, Letting the CAT out of the Bag: Providing
a Civil Right ofAction for Torture Committed by U.S. Officials Abroad, an Obligation of
the Convention against Torture?, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L 187, 194-96 (2005).
E. General International Law: International Court of
Justice and International Law Commission
The practice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) demonstrates a
different approach to general international law on remedies when compared
to the ECHR and the HRC. A classic international substantive remedy is
found in the Chorz6w case, where the ICJ stated "[I]t is a principle of
international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach
of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation."'', Further,
Judge Rosalyn Higgins illustrates the correlation between the right and
remedy in her separate opinion in the 2004 Legality of Use of Force
case:
The power of the Court to identify remedies for any breach of a treaty, in a case
where jurisdiction was based solely upon the treaty concerned, has been
regarded as within the Court's inherent powers in the Corfu Channel case.52
In Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, the ICJ confirmed its position in
another case, the LaGrand case:
The Court would recall in this regard, as it did in the LaGrand case, that, where
jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for
jurisdiction is required by the Court in order to consider remedies a party has
requested for the breach of the obligation.53
The rule is that international substantive remedy is a part of the right and
that international procedural remedy will be available if there is
jurisdiction for the right itself.54 On the other hand, when the Court
postponed the reparation issue for a separate phase of the proceeding 55 or
refused to award a remedy when perceived as contrary to a judicial
function, it showed a decomposition of the Court's remedial function.56
51. Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 29 (Sept.
13).
52. Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), 2004 I.C.J. 336 (Dec. 15)
(separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (citation ommitted), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/105/8446.pdf.
53. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 33 (Mar.
31) (citation omitted), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf
?PHPSESSID=61 le2b 7dc0a931e33c1 f3eb073a4c3da.
54. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 142 (June 27) ("In general, jurisdiction to determine the merits of a
dispute entails jurisdiction to determine reparation.").
55. E.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. 15 (March 25) (preliminary
objections); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9) (merits); Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 244 (Dec. 15) (assessment of the amount of compensation due
from the People's Republic of Albania to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland).
56. Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 2).
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The jurisdiction of the ICJ to order remedies is based on the right of
the Court to decide "the nature or extent of reparation" as provided in
Article 36(2) of the Court's Statute. However, the wording of that provision
seems to only include reparations.5 7
The Court's ambivalence in ordering specific remedies, either in
the form of specific performance or injunctive relief, has not been
brought about by Article 36 but rather by its pragmatic views on the
adequacy of the remedy and its jurisdiction to act upon it. It may be safe
to argue that the Court would have expanded international remedies but
for the 1928 Chorz6w case. In that case, the Court assumed jurisdiction to
order restitution or specific performance on the grounds that it had
acquired jurisdiction for interpretation and application of a treaty.5 8
Some authors flatly dismiss doubts regarding the grounds and options the
Court had for issuing remedies and labeled the choice as "the creative
process [which] has been pragmatic, unselfconscious and somewhat
unreflective., 59 Others retained their skepticism.
60
The freedom with which the Court assumed jurisdiction to issue
remedies has been further expanded by its willingness to issue specific
57. Statute of the International Court of Justice. art. 36(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 ("The states parties to the present Statute may at any time
declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation
of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c, the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.").
58. CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987) ("But
the scope of the Court's power to order other remedies such as restitution or specific
performance under a compromissory clause like that in the Chorz6w Factory case or
under the Optional Clause is not clear. In a few cases the claimant state has requested the
Court to order the defendant state to act in a certain way but until very recently in the
Iranian Hostages case (and possibly not even then) the Court has never made such an
order, nor has it ever discussed the power to do so.").
59. lan Brownlie, Remedies in the International Court of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS
557, 558 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
60. GRAY, supra note 58, at 68 ("Therefore it remains unclear, even after the
Iranian Hostages case, whether the generosity of the Court in asserting its
jurisdiction to award damages does or should extend to making an order
requiring or forbidding certain behaviour by states in cases where, as in the
Chorz6w Factory case, the Court has jurisdiction only to decide on the
interpretation or application of a treaty, or where it has jurisdiction under
Article 36(2) of the Statue of the Court.").
remedial measures. The debate over its jurisdiction to issue remedies and
the correlation between the right and remedy has shifted to the power of
the Court to choose the appropriate remedy, or more precisely, to move
from declaratory judgments to judgments ordering specific performance
or injunctive relief. In the U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff case,6' the
Court ordered Iran to immediately terminate the unlawful detention of
diplomatic and consular staff, release hostages, place them under the protecting
power, enable them to leave the country, and protect diplomatic property.
In the Arrest Warrant case, the Court directed Belgium to cancel the
arrest warrant of 11 April 2000.62. Even advisory opinions tend to comprise
quite specific remedial forms. In the proceeding regarding the immunity
status of the U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, the Court, in its advisory opinion, suggested an overreaching
judicial remedy: "That Dato' Param Cumaraswamy shall be held financially
harmless for any costs imposed upon him by the Malaysian courts, in
particular taxed costs., 63 In the advisory opinion Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the
Court, after having found Israel responsible under international law for
building the wall, concluded that
[I]t is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the
wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around
East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to
repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating
thereto, in accordance with paragraph 151 of this Opinion. 
 t
In the Avena case, following the conclusions in LaGrand, the Court
concluded that the appropriate remedy would be a review and reconsideration
of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals.65  In the
Avena case, the nature of remedies was the crucial issue. As the reparation
must correspond to the injury, the ICJ found that the appropriate national
remedy should be a review and reconsideration of domestic cases by
U.S. courts in order to determine whether the violation caused actual
prejudice to the defendant. On the other hand, the Court found that
61. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, 44-45 (May 24), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/64/6291.pdf.
62. Arrest Warrant of 1 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 33
(Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf.
63. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 90 (Apr. 29),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/I 00/7619.pdf.
64. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 201-02 (July 9), available at http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/13 1/1671 .pdf.
65. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 73 (Mar.
31).
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annulment of a conviction or sentence would not provide the necessary and
sole remedy, nor could the clemency proceeding replace a judicial
remedy.66 Though the Court framed the international remedy as an
obligation of means to be fulfilled by the United States by means of its
67own choosing, the Court, by setting the conditions and limits for the
obligation to review and reconsider national criminal cases at hand, was
just a step away from framing the national remedy required from the
United States. This judgment exemplifies an international court's process of
directing national remedies through framing international ones. Still, the
Court did not take that step in this case as it did in the advisory opinion
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in 1999.68
In the Genocide case, the Court, found Serbia responsible for failing to
prevent genocide in Srebrenica and failing to punish responsible individuals
for committing genocide. The remedy granted by the Court was specified
as a duty to punish and transfer individuals accused of genocide to the
ICTY. The remedies for all other previously mentioned cases could fall
under the interpretation of the obligation restitutio in integrum, despite
the silence of the Statute on the matter. The remedy in the last case
certainly represents the order for specific performance with the aim to
achieve a sui generis restorative remedy as the international substantive
remedy. Interestingly, the Genocide case shows different remedial forms
opted for by the Court: declaratory judgment with respect to the responsibility
for not preventing the genocide massacre in Srebrenica and specific
performance with respect to punishing individuals responsible for genocide.
Recent jurisprudence of the ICJ has continued the trend of developing
remedial forms in international law that are more precisely outlined
obligations. However, this has not occurred without inconsistencies.
Though the discussion on different remedial forms may seem unnecessary,
69
available remedial options could echo the needs of victims as genuine
holders of legal interests in many cases and possible direct or indirect
beneficiaries of the Court's findings. 70 As such, they may be valuable.
66. Id at 59-70 (extensively discussing the issue of remedies).
67. Id. at 62, 72.
68. See Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
69. Brownlie, supra note 60, at 560.
70. Enrico Milano, Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights Before the International
Court of Justice: Re-Fashioning Tradition?, 35 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 132, 141 (2004)
("However, the remedial measures ordered by the Court in all of those disputes show
Since this Article refers only to remedies as issued by international
bodies, reference to the International Law Commission (ILC) here seems
necessary. In terms of the general rule on remedies for international law
violations, Article 34 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility prescribes
the following: "Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction,
either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter. 71 This Article comprises what has firmly been established
in international law. Still, the position of an individual as a beneficiary
of a remedy has never been a subject-matter of the work of the ILC.72
Remedies for individuals, within the framework of general international
law, have been dealt with indirectly through the rules of exhaustion of
local remedies in the course of diplomatic protection and as a basis for
state responsibility in cases of denial of justice.73 However, these rules
do not seem to establish the victim's right to claim and receive a remedy
as a direct beneficiary of the right. Victims are treated rather as objects
in international legal transactions. Further, the Report of the International
Law Association (ILA) explicitly confirms that "Given that there is
little evidence in international customary law for an individual right to
a remedy for violations of human rights law and international
humanitarian law, it still remains true that such a right must be provided
for by an express provision.
74
that the Court is indeed taking into account the background of the political dispute
involved, which is about the life of those convicted nationals, and it is willing to order
remedies that address the legal rights of the individuals concerned. The Court's approach in
that context undoubtedly marks a pro-active approach.... [T]here is much to suggest
that the Court has entered, or perhaps was forced to enter, into a new 'age' of diplomatic
protection where the rights of the state, individual rights and human rights are fully
intertwined. It is inevitable that the first steps are tentative and over-cautious as the
planet of individual rights, human rights and domestic legal systems is a planet ruled by
different forces with which the Court has to become acquainted.").
71. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra
note 21, at art. 34.
72. Tomuschat, supra note 1, at 174 ("The ILC was of the opinion that the law of
state responsibility would be sufficiently well-ordered by devising rules governing inter-
state relationships. It was also decided that the responsibility of international organizations
would be tackled at another time. However, at no time was attention focused on the
individual in this connection.").
73. See generally JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 202-
27 (2005).
74. RAINER HOFMANN & FRANK RIEMANN, INT'L LAW Assoc. CoMm. ON
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF WAR, BACKGROUND REPORT ON COMPENSATION FOR
VICTIMS OF WAR 31 (2004), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CompensationforVictims
ofWar/BackgroundreportAugust2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (footnote omitted);
see also Int'l Law Assoc. Comm. on Comp. for Victims of War, Compensation for Victims of
War, 72 INT'L L. Ass'N REP. CoNF. 761, 764 (2006) (final report accepting this position
in its summary conclusions in somewhat less elaborate manner) ("Finally, there was no
consensus as to whether the present state of international law, as it results from
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According to these findings, it seems possible to claim that no general
rule of customary international law exists which guarantees an individual
right to remedy under international law in cases of violation of human
rights. There is even less of a right in cases of grave human rights
violations. 75 This creates a paradox in international law. The ease with
which international bodies have merged rights and remedies cannot be
reconciled with the idea that no individual right to reparation has come
into existence. This objection may be a more general objection against
human rights remedies: "Human rights remedies, even when successful,
treat the symptoms rather than the illness, and this allows the illness not
only to fester, but to seem like health itself."
76
However, there may be an avenue to solve the paradox and claim that
there is an emerging right to the remedy under customary international
law, which may be invoked directly for the benefit of individuals rather
than their national states. Contrary to Tomuschat's opinion,77 there still
seems to be room to interpret the ILC rules on state responsibility so as
to include the victims as direct beneficiaries of the remedies for violations
of human rights: "[P]erformance of the obligation of reparation in
accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State
or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached., 78 Although there is
applicable treaty and customary law, allows for any final conclusion as to the existence
of a right to compensation, held and being enforceable by the individual victims of such
violations of international law, as distinct from the universally accepted existence of the
right of States to claim-in their own right-'compensation' for violations of
international law norms the victims of which were their nationals.").
75. PROVOST, supra note 3, at 44 ("Given the nature of human rights as essentially
individual rights, however, a substantive right to a remedy appears as a necessary
element of the normative framework of human rights. Without such an element, the
danger looms of that 'vain thing' of a right without a remedy threatening the reality of
human rights as rights of individuals. Despite the desirable character of such a rule, there is
little evidence to suggest that it has evolved into customary law.") (footnotes omitted);
Tomuschat, supra note 1, at 183 ("At the present time there exists no general rule of
customary international law to the effect that any grave violations of human rights
creates an individual reparation claim under international law. As shown above, such a
claim has no basis in practice as far as mass-scale injustices are concerned, whether they
result from internal or international patterns of violations of human rights."); see
generally, Christian Tomuschat, Individual Reparations Claims in Instances of Grave
Human Rights Violations: The Position Under General International Law, in: STATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: REPARATION IN INSTANCES OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-25 (Albrecht Randelzhofer & Christian Tomuschat eds., 1999).
76. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?,
15 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 101, 118 (2002).
77. See Tomuschat, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
78. Work of its Fifty- Third Session, supra note 2 1, art. 48 (emphasis added).
no standing for the victim to raise such a claim directly, it still might be
considered as a step further in recognizing the victim's direct interest in
a remedy.79 If human rights bodies were in position to expand their
jurisdiction to order remedies not provided for in treaties, the question is
how victims could benefit either from the theory underlying expansion
of jurisdiction or from the expanded jurisdiction itself.
F. Human Rights Commission and U.N. Documents
Further developments in the law of remedies are evinced in several
U.N. documents which focus on the remedies. The most comprehensive
catalog of remedies has been offered in the Basic Principles and Guidelines
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles),8 ° which comprises almost thirty
different remedies. An interesting feature of Basic Principles is its starting
point and focus: the remedial structure has been set up as a whole,
regardless of the character and source of the norm or right which has
been violated.81 The starting position is the last step to be undertaken,
namely remedies. This structure suggests that all remedies are always
available to all victims of all human rights violations. The broad and all-
encompassing approach, if coupled with the broad definition of victims-
which arguably may include both direct and indirect victims82-may
open a vast horizon of possibilities for claims.
In defining potential beneficiaries of remedies, it is useful to look at how
U.N. documents conceptualize victims. The Declaration of Basic Principles
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (Declaration) 83 defines
victims as "persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm,
including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or
79. See Milano, supra note 70, at 106.
80. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, 15-23, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/60/147/Annex (Dec. 16, 2005).
81. Tomuschat, supra note 1, at 160 ("Bassiouni produced a final report in January
of 2000, which answers all prayers, as victims would be granted all conceivable rights.").
82. E.g., Heidi Rombouts & Stef Vandeginste, Reparation for Victims of Gross
and Systematic Human Rights Violations: The Notion of Victim, 2000-2003 THIRD
WORLD LEGAL STuD. 89, 112 (2003) ("[L]egal and social analysis indicates, in our view,
that under any human rights mechanism, the notion of victim should be defined as
broadly as possible. Anyone who has been sufficiently directly affected by a human
rights violation should be considered a victim. This recognition of victim status may in
itself constitute some sort of reparation.").
83. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34 (Nov.
29,1985).
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substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions
that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States,
including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power., 84 Basic
Principles identifies victims as "persons who individually or collectively
suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering,
economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights,
through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international
human rights law, or serious violations of international humanitarian law."85
These two definitions are ratione personae practically identical: persons,
both individuals and groups, who endure different kinds of suffering and
impairment, regardless of their personal stance toward the violation and
intent to pursue any proceeding, are qualified as victims. The difference
is in the basis of these violations. The Declaration relies upon the criminal
law of member states, i.e. violation of domestic law which incurs
international responsibility. Basic Principles refers exclusively to international
human rights law as a source of the obligation, thus making this ratione
materiae difference between the two documents relevant.
In drafting and adopting the Basic Principles, the drafters put them
through several stages and readings, two of which deserve special
attention. In 1993, Mr. Theo Van Boven as a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights prepared the Final Report and Study
Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation
for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 86 which served as the basis for further developments of the
Basic Principles. The second stage, evinced in the 2000 final report of
the Special Rapporteur, M. Cherif Bassiouni, introduced the definition
which eventually found its place in the 2005 Basic Principles, namely:
"A person is 'a victim' where, as a result of acts or omissions that
constitute a violation of international human rights or humanitarian law
norms, that person, individually or collectively, suffered harm, including
84. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, Annex, 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/34/Annex (Dec. 11, 1985).
85. G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 80, 8.
86. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution,
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violation of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993) (prepared by
Theo van Boven).
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, or impairment
of that person's fundamental legal rights."87
The intention of the drafters of both documents was to define
victimhood as extensively as possible. They restricted the definition to
only ratione materiae, e.g. domestic criminal law in the first place, and
gross violations of international human rights in the second. The broad
approach may have been created in an attempt not allow states to
circumvent the rights of victims by invoking a restrictive victim clause.
However, this attempt may have been in vain because of the vague
and imprecise definition of victim. The other restrictions in obtaining a
remedy are external. They dictate how the recognized legal interest may
be emptied through restrictive rules on standing before international and
national fora, and may place restrictions on the right to recover when a
lack of nexus exists between the right and remedy.
In contrast to the large number of remedies offered by the Basic
Principles, other international instruments have not been as generous
with regard to the types of remedies available. The general trend of
enhancing the jurisdictions of courts to grant remedies, together with an
increasing variety of remedial forms, seems to have been accepted by
international courts .8  However, it has not been accepted to the degree
announced in the Basic Principles. Other international instruments have
not embraced a generic and broad understanding of the right to remedy,
regardless of the specific content and context of the particular provision
providing for a remedy. The remedy-based approach of human rights
announced in Basic Principles merges different normative meanings of
remedies and stands for the proposition that "in general terms, then, an
'effective remedy' includes the right to bring claims before a judicial
system capable of resolving allegations of human rights abuses, issuing
judgments and granting enforceable awards of compensation. 89 However,
not all international instruments have interpreted the right in such broad
terms.
87. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Civil and Political Rights, Including
the Question of- Independence of the Judiciary, Administration of Justice, Impunity, Annex,
8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62/Annex (Jan. 18, 2000) (prepared by M. Cherif Bassiouni).
88. Such a trend does not seem to be very comprehensively embraced by all
intemational courts, arbitrations, and bodies. Schreuer demonstrates the reluctance of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunals to order
non-pecuniary judgments, despite the fact that legal framework of ICSID arbitrations is
in this respect quite similar to other international courts. See Christopher Schreuer, Non-
Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT'L 325, 325-32 (2004).
89. Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 48 (2002); see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate
and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV.
451, 482 (1990).
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G. Addressees of the Obligation to Provide Remedy
The potential addressees of the obligation to provide remedies are
multiplied by the increase of both procedural and substantive remedies.
One discovers a multitude of potential respondents against whom victims
may possess a legal interest through remedies. Additionally, these
addressees are not necessarily always states as the ultimate holder of
international responsibility. In certain cases, a state is only a subsidiary
addressee. For example, the principle of criminal accountability primarily
addresses criminals. States which have a duty to prosecute criminals
undertake a duty which puts them in a position of an addressee. The
multiple potential addressees responsible for the rehabilitation of victims
can be seen in civil remedies and the right to compensation. If compensation
is an appropriate remedy, there is no clear answer to who should shoulder
the burden of that compensation.
Additionally, the Basic Principles refer exclusively to gross violations
of human rights. As such, an international procedural remedy is not
likely to be available to a victim because a "mass," "gross," or "systematic"
violation of human rights has not been judicially recognized. The vast,
unconquered territory of international remedies certainly may leave
national courts in a difficult situation and victims without a remedy. The
Article will now move to a discussion of the dilemmas national courts
must face in their responses to international remedies.
III. NATIONAL COURTS AND REMEDIES
When implementing international law into national legal systems,
national courts and agencies perform a remedial function that has specific
features. This is because of the concreteness of the remedy required and
definite character of the obligation imposed. Also, constitutional
requirements, on the one hand, and different and evolutive approaches to
remedies by international institutions, on the other hand, might lead
national courts to perform remedial functions on ad hoc basis, rather
than in a systematic manner. Other factors, such as deference to the
executive, the political questions doctrine, and incapacity of courts to
handle international legal issues, can contribute to differential treatment
of remedies by a domestic judiciary.
A. Damages vs. Specific Performance: Problems in
Implementing the CAT Views
In a criminal case before an appellate court in Serbia which lasted for
almost ten years, 90 the court examined both the sentencing judgment and
the human rights aspects of the decision. Though concurring with the
trial court in its qualification of the criminal offense and responsibility, the
appellate court disagreed on the issue of criminal sanction. It found that
the length of the proceeding should have been given weight in assessing
the sentence. Because the length of the criminal proceeding violated the
rights of the accused and his right to a fair trial within a reasonable
time, the court ex officio commuted the sentence of imprisonment to
parole. Here, the national court sought and found the remedy for the
violation of human rights by recognizing its role as the addressee in a
quite precise manner: not only did the court invoke Article 6(1) of the
ECHR and jurisprudence regarding the standard of "reasonable time," but
it also explicitly relied on the Committee of Ministers' Recommendation
on the Improvement of Domestic Remedies. 9' The court concluded:
Having found that the requirement of the reasonable time has been violated in
this case, strict criminal sanction of imprisonment is not a justifiable measure
under criminal law, pursuant to the Recommendation of the Committee of
Ministers REC (2004)6 on the Improvement of Domestic Remedies, which
finds that where the criminal proceedings have exceeded a reasonable time, this
may result in a more lenient sentence being imposed. 92
The court here dutifully followed all instructions on remedies even before
they were imposed and, in an exceptional manner, invoked the Council
of Europe's recommendation in this respect.
There are other cases in which national courts do not respond so
obediently in awarding remedies for violations of human rights. This is
especially true in restorative measures such as commuting the
sentence. Many courts, in trying to reconcile the limitations of their
own jurisdiction and the internationally imposed obligation, mismatch
the remedial forms. In the case of Risti6 v. Yugoslavia before the U.N.
Committee Against Torture, mentioned above,93 the CAT found a violation
of the remedial provisions of the Convention and ordered specific
performance-conducting an investigation-as the remedy. The CAT
found the legal basis for this remedy in the substantive provisions of the
90. Okruini sud u Subotici (Srbija), Krivi6no odeljenje [District Court in Subotica
(Serbia), Criminal Law Chamber], Judgment No. K2. 266/05, Aug. 15, 2005 (on file with
author) (translated by author).
91. Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the
Improvement of Domestic Remedies, supra note 27.
92. See Judgment No. K2. 266/05, supra note 90, at 3.
93. See Risti6, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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Convention, which clearly outline the obligation of national authorities
to perform investigations when there is reasonable ground to believe that
an act of torture has been committed in any territory under their
jurisdictions. However, the Committee refused to assess reparations:
With regard to allegations of a violation of article 14, the Committee finds that
in the absence of proper criminal investigation, it is not possible to determine
whether the rights to compensation of the alleged victim or his family have been
violated. Such an assessment can only be made after the conclusion of proper
investigations. The Committee therefore urges the State party to carry out such
investigations without delay.94
When the case returned to the national courts with a request for
implementation, the first instance court in Serbia awarded damages for
the violation of human rights.95 However, it refused to order investigation or
mandatory publication of the CAT's decision in daily newspapers because it
found these requests inadmissible before a civil court. The damages
awarded represent a national remedy for failure to implement the decision
of the CAT and failure to conduct an impartial investigation after the
adoption of the decision. They do not represent enforcement of international
remedy as required by the Committee. Interestingly, the Supreme Court
of Serbia in affirming the judgment of the lower court gave full account
of the Convention and its remedial structures and fully concurred with
the decision of the CAT. It emphasized Article 22 as the basis for
jurisdiction to proceed on the matter, as well as Articles 12 to 14 which
deal with remedial functions. As the civil court did not have jurisdiction
to order the remedy requested, the Supreme Court decided to substitute




95. Prvi opgtinski sud u Beogradu [First Municipal Court in Belgrade], Judgment
No. P.2236/04, Dec. 30, 2004 (affirmed by the Supreme Court of Serbia on February 8,
2006) (awarding total amount of damages to parents of the victim, as a just satisfaction
for violation of individual rights, in amount around E 12,000).
96. Vrhovni sud Srbije [Supreme Court of Serbia], Judgment No. Rev. 66/06, Feb.
8, 2006 (petition for revision submitted by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
denied).
B. Declaratory Judgments vs. Specific Performance: Choice of a
Remedy by the International Court of Justice
1. Genocide Convention Case: A Vanished Victimhood
Though it may be too soon to assess the national impact of the ICJ
judgment in the Application of Convention on the Prohibition and
Prevention the Crime of Genocide of February 26, 2007, it may be
useful to look into the consequences and reactions of national courts
with respect to the ordered remedies. As mentioned, the ICJ found
Serbia responsible for not preventing the genocide in Srebrenica, for not
punishing those responsible for committing genocide, and for failing to
implement provisional measures order of the ICJ. The remedies for these
breaches are two-fold. The first set of remedies consists of the duty to
carry out obligations of a more general nature "Serbia shall immediately
take effective steps to ensure full compliance with its obligation under
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide to punish acts of genocide as defined by Article II of the
Convention, or any of the other acts proscribed by Article III of the
Convention."97 Additionally, the remedy included specific performance "to
transfer individuals accused of genocide or any of those other acts for trial
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and to
co-operate fully with that Tribunal. 98 The failure to transfer Ratko
Mladid to the ICTY, who has been indicted for genocide and complicity
in genocide before the ICTY, per se constituted the breach of the
obligation to punish under the Genocide Convention.9 9 The second set of
remedies is of declaratory and non-compensatory character:
[The Court] finds that, as regards the breaches by Serbia of the obligations
referred to in subparagraphs (5) and (7) above, the Court's findings in those
paragraphs constitute appropriate satisfaction, and that the case is not one in
which an order for payment of compensation, or, in respect of the violation
referred to in subparagraph (5), a direction to provide assurances and guarantees
of non-repetition, would be appropriate. 00
Therefore, in the opinion of the ICJ, finding a violation is just
satisfaction for the breach of the Genocide Convention. Declaratory
97. Application of Convention on the Prohibition and Prevention of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 170, available at http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/1 3685.pdf?PHPSESSID-d6c988361c33e4962b3bl 05fd82492e.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 169 ("Serbia has violated its obligations under the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by having failed to transfer Ratko
Mladi6, indicted for genocide and complicity in genocide, for trial by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and thus having failed fully to co-operate
with that Tribunal.").
100. Id. at 170.
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judgment in itself is a remedy.' 0 The Court even went further, to say
that compensation would not be an appropriate remedy. 0 2 Apart from
the Court's own explanation for this approach, which lies in the
unproven nexus between the unlawful act and damage-which may be at
odds with the finding of responsibility despite its "obligation of means"
character-there might be other possible justifications for this approach.
These include the ability to overcome a difficult political burden created
by the lengthy and complex proceeding; to cease the dispute through
reparations; to avoid difficulties in assessing the damages; and to prevent
collective punishment. It is, however, difficult to understand the theory
underlying the restrictive remedial approach when the case involved a
number of victims of genocide. Still, the complete silence on remedies
might also provide some insight into and proof of the irrelevance of
victims and their victimhood in the international arena.
Declaratory judgments, as shown above, are the rule rather than the
exception in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. In terms of national implementation,
declaratory judgments do not require enforcement of remedies before
domestic courts (though, it could be argued that national courts are prevented
from denying, and therefore from reversing, the findings of the ICJ).
Apart from the negative or passive aspect of implementation, national
courts do not seem to be the addressee of the ICJ rulings. Still, the
victims, whose plight was the subject-matter of the case, are presumably
redressed through the declaratory judgment.
Additionally, the gravity of the crime seems to be at odds with the
remedy awarded in the case. The declaratory remedy was chosen for the
illegal acts affecting victims, whereas specific performance was imposed
for undoing wrong, which could be arguably construed as indirect satisfaction
for victims. Despite the victims' weak non-procedural position in the
case and the low probability for redistribution of compensation-which,
if it had been directly awarded, would have been owed to the applicant
State-the victims still were left without any promise of an international
remedy, although the harm suffered by them was fully adjudged and
declared.
101. Id. at 165-66.
102. Id. at 165 ("Since the Court cannot therefore regard as proven a causal nexus
between the Respondent's violation of its obligation of prevention and the damage
resulting from the genocide at Srebrenica, financial compensation is not the appropriate
form of reparation for the breach of the obligation to prevent genocide .... ").
The declaratory judgment in the Genocide case arguably bars any
nationally pursued claims for damages by the victims on the basis that
the just satisfaction of the international remedy was fully awarded by the
ICJ. Due to the fragmented remedial structure of international law, it is
possible that international responsibility may be decided and international
remedies exhausted still with an option to pursue national remedies in
the national legal framework. As we can see from previous cases, it
would not be impossible for a national court to award a national remedy
for an international wrong, even if the remedy has not been explicitly
ordered by an international body.
2. Vienna Convention Cases: Victims Lost in a Neverland of Remedies
The problems in implementing the ICJ rulings containing specific
performance as a remedy are well illustrated by a set of proceedings
against the United States concerning the implementation of three ICJ
decisions in the matter concerning Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations. In addition, a number of other U.S. cases illustrate
the hurdles related to establishing and enforcing rights and remedies of
foreigners. Most cases deal with enforcing rights and remedies under
the Consular Convention or rulings containing international remedies' °3
ordered by international bodies, such as the ICJ10 4 and Inter-American
Court of Human Rights.1
0 5
Both state and federal U.S. courts have routinely denied enforcement
of international remedies or granted national remedies for the violation
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations with respect to foreigners.
In national cases affecting aliens whose legal interest was the subject
matter of the claim before the ICJ, U.S. courts have refused to transpose
international remedies into national procedural and substantive remedies.
In the Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, the ICJ ruled that violation
of individual rights under the Vienna Convention required "review and
reconsideration" of national cases as a remedy. 10 6 Though the ICJ stressed
103. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006); Medellin v. Dretke, 371
F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004) cert. granted, then dismissed; Torres v. Oklahoma, 962 P.2d 3
(Okla. Crim. App. 1998); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); Medina v. Texas,
529 U.S. 1102 (2002) cert. denied; LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F. 3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998).
104. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 1. C. J. 12 (Mar.
31); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I. C. J. 466 (June 27); Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I. C. J. 248 (Apr. 9) (provisional measures).
105. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 16 (Oct. 1, 1999). Javier Suarez Medina v. United States, Case 12.421,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 91/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5 (2005).
106. Avena, 2004 I.C.J at 60 ("It follows that the remedy to make good these
violations should consist in an obligation on the United States to permit review and
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that "review and reconsideration" was the obligation of means rather
than the obligation of result and a specific performance remedy to be
chosen by the United States "on its own choosing," the ICJ still considerably
limited the right of the United States to choose the appropriate procedural
remedy. First, the ICJ explicitly excluded the executive clemency as an
adequate remedy for the violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.
Second, it suggested that the judicial branch was the addressee of the
obligation. 107
The ICJ, therefore, did not suggest that all sentences handed down in
the face of violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
should have been annulled, as proposed by the Mexican government in
its restitutio in integrum argument.'0 8 It suggested that all sentences
should be judicially reviewed and reconsidered in light of the prejudice
caused by the violation of an individual right of a foreigner.10 9 Therefore, it
reconsideration of these nationals' cases by the United States courts, as the Court will
explain further in paragraphs 128 to 134 below, with a view to ascertaining whether in
each case the violation of Article 36 committed by the competent authorities caused
actual prejudice to the defendant.").
107. Id. at 65-66 ("In this regard, the Court would point out that what is crucial in
the review and reconsideration process is the existence of a procedure which guarantees
that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention,
whatever may be the actual outcome of such review and reconsideration. As has been
explained in paragraphs 128 to 134 above, the Court is of the view that, in cases where
the breach of the individual rights of Mexican nationals under Article 36, paragraph 1
(b), of the Convention has resulted, in the sequence of judicial proceedings that has
followed, in the individuals concerned being subjected to prolonged detention or
convicted and sentenced to severe penalties, the legal consequences of this breach have
to be examined and taken into account in the course of review and reconsideration. The
Court considers that it is the judicial process that is suited to this task. . . . The Court
notes, however, that the clemency process, as currently practiced within the United
States criminal justice system, does not appear to meet the requirements described in
paragraph 138 above and that it is therefore not sufficient in itself to serve as an
appropriate means of 'review and reconsideration' as envisaged by the Court in the
LaGrand case.").
108. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), Verbatim Record CR
2003/25, at 35, (Mar. 15, 2003) (Mexico's argument at oral proceeding by Mr. Donovan),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/4079.pdf ("For that reason, restitution
here must take the form of annulment of the convictions and sentences that resulted from
the proceedings tainted by the Article 36 violations. It follows from the very nature of
restitutio that, when a violation of an international obligation is manifested in a judicial
act, that act must be annulled and thereby deprived of any force or effect in the national
legal system. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it is well established that the restoration of the
status quo ante may require an order that a domestic judgment be annulled.").
109. Some scholars seem to argue for a more radical approach to remedies than the
ICJ itself. Measures suggested by writers embrace different views on the restitutio in
integrum character of a remedy: release of the detained individual; dismissal of the
is up to the national courts to choose an adequate national remedy to
comport with the international remedy of "review and reconsideration."
Courts of the United States have read these instructions in many
different ways but tend to reject the suggested remedy. Several cases
stand out as illustrations of the methods which can be used to overcome
difficulties associated with the implementation of international remedies.
Rather, they may demonstrate the difficulties in the reconciliation between
international and national remedies. In the Torres case,1 10 the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals found that the violation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and the ruling of the ICJ in the Avena
case established the right to judicial review of Torres's sentence.
However, as Torres had been granted clemency on May 13, 2004, the
Oklahoma court conducted a review of the procedural remedy, declaring
that Torres had been prejudiced by violation of the Vienna Convention,
and found that a substantive remedy had already been granted in the
form of clemency and commuted sentence." 1 Though the court denied
relief on the basis that such a relief was unnecessary and rendered the
indictment; suppression of the incriminating evidence; reversal of a conviction; a trial de
novo. See generally William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:
A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 310-12 (1998);
Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search
for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 610-12 (1997); Frederic L. Kirgis,
Restitution as a Remedy in U.S. Courts for Violations of International Law, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 341, 341 (2001); Erik G. Luna & Douglass J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17
BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 147, 176-77 (1999).
110. Torres v. Oklahoma, 120 P.3d 1184, 1187-92 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
111. Id. at 1189-90 ("After a thorough evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that
Torres had been prejudiced by the violation of his Vienna Convention rights, and
declined to find whether trial counsel had been ineffective. Upon review, this Court
concludes, first, that Torres suffered actual prejudice regarding his Vienna Convention
claim only in the context of his capital sentence. The record shows that the Mexican
government would have, and subsequently has, offered Torres assistance in finding and
presenting mitigating evidence in order to avoid the imposition of the death penalty.
Second, we find that, while evidence does not show trial counsel's acts or omissions
would have affected the jury's determination of guilt, trial counsel's performance might
have affected the jury's decision to impose death. However, Torres no longer faces a
sentence of death. The Oklahoma Constitution and statutes vest in the Governor the
power to both commute and impose restrictions on sentences after criminal conviction.
The Governor exercised that power in this case. By Executive Order he granted clemency
with the condition that Torres shall not be eligible to be considered for parole for the
remainder of his life. A commuted sentence has the same legal effect as though the
sentence had originally been for the commuted term. We find that Torres is not entitled
to relief from his convictions for murder either as a result of Vienna Convention violations or
through counsel's actions. We find that Torres was actually prejudiced by the failure to
inform him of his rights under the Vienna Convention, and by counsel's acts or
omissions which might have affected his sentencing. However, the Executive Branch
grant of clemency and limitation of Torres's sentence to life without the possibility of
parole renders these issues moot. Consequently, no relief is required. Torres's application for
post-conviction relief is denied.") (footnotes omitted).
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issue moot, the court still observed that "[h]ad the Governor not granted
clemency, this Court would have been required to grant relief on that
claim."' 12
When the violation of individual rights under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations is shifted from criminal to civil remedies, the
issue that arises is whether an alien is entitled to damages.' 13 Unlike
many other cases which deal with restorative national remedies within a
criminal proceeding, the case of Jogi v. Voges 114 raised the issue of
national civil remedies for the failure of state officials to inform arrested
foreign nationals of their right to consular notification. In the first set of
proceedings, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found
that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention conferred individual rights on
detained nationals but also an implied private right of action to enforce
the individual's Article 36 rights." 5 In the second set of proceedings, the
same court reversed its previous decision and established its jurisdiction
solely on federal question jurisdiction, namely 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The
court then awarded the remedy to the victim, recognizing the cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a private right of action as
a remedy when a violation of a statute, and presumably a treaty, granting
an individual right has been established. 1 6 Though the final enforcement of
remedies is still to be conducted, 1 7 the court established a national civil
remedy for an internationally wrongful act. It did so without encroaching
on the U.S. Supreme Court's finding on the limited availability of criminal
remedies for violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations."'
112. Id. at 1190.
113. See Kirgis, supra note 109, at 341 (stating U.S. courts have rarely addressed
restitution as a possible remedy).
114. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2005).
115. Id. at 385 ("We conclude, therefore, relying on the language of Article 36, the
purpose of the Article, and the need to interpret the Vienna Convention in a manner
consistent with the other states party to the Convention, that there is an implied private
right of action to enforce the individual's Article 36 rights.").
116. Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 835-36 (7th Cir. 2007).
117. Chimrne I. Keitner & Kenneth C. Randall, The Seventh Circuit Again Finds
Jurisdiction for Private Remedies for Violations ofArtcile 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, ASIL INSIGHTS., May 16, 2007), http://asil.org/insights/2007/05/
insights070514.html ("While the Seventh Circuit's confirmation of federal jurisdiction is
significant, the case will now be sent back to the district court, and the ultimate outcome
is far from settled. The district court will have to determine whether Jogi filed his
complaint within the applicable time limit, and whether the defendant Illinois officials
are entitled to immunity.").
118. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). For a general overview of
the impact of the Sanchez case on national remedies for the violation of the Vienna
The Jogi case, regardless of its final outcome, demonstrates the necessity
to find national remedies for international violations, or in other words,
to identify national counterparts for international remedies. This practice
is preferable to transplanting international remedies as established by
international courts into national arenas.
Another case illustrative of the search for, or defense from, remedies
for victims of violations of international law within the U.S. legal system
is the Medellin case.' 19 Medellin's right to consular assistance was the
subject matter of the ICJ's ruling in the Avena case. 120 Medellin's right
to consular assistance arguably constituted his right to remedy both on
the basis of the decision and on the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. His attempts to have his conviction reviewed as a violation of
the Vienna Convention had failed. Additionally, he was consistently
denied the right to a national criminal remedy for the violation of
individual rights under international law.
The U.S. Supreme Court first granted certiorari but subsequently
denied it on the basis of two developments in the case. First, President
Bush issued a memorandum that stated the United States would discharge
its international obligations under the Avena judgment. Medellin, relying
on this memorandum and the Avena judgment, filed a successive state
application for a writ of habeas corpus. Second, the Supreme Court held
that a state proceeding might provide Medellin with the review and
reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim, and therefore, its action
in the matter were not required.' 21 However, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals refused to grant the remedy of review to Medellin, finding that
Convention, see Janet K. Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: the Glass is Half Full, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 29, 38-40 (2007).
119. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 I. C. J. 12 (Mar.
31).
120. Id. at 53 ("[The International Court of Justice] finds that, by not informing,
without delay upon their detention, the 51 Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph
106 (1) above of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, the United Stales of America breached the
obligations incumbent upon it under that subparagraph."). Subparagraph 106 (1) of the
case reads: "On this aspect of the case, the Court thus concludes: (1) that the United
States committed breaches of the obligation incumbent upon it under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention to inform detained Mexican nationals or their
rights under that paragraph, in the case of the following 51 individuals: Avena (case No.
1), Ayala (case No. 2), Benavides (case No. 3) ... Medellin (case No. 38) .. "). Id. at
53-54.
121. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("In light of
the possibility that the Texas courts will provide Medellin with the review he seeks
pursuant to the Avena judgment and the President's memorandum, and the potential for
review in this Court once the Texas courts have heard and decided Medellin's pending
action, we think it would be unwise to reach and resolve the multiple hindrances to
dispositive answers to the questions here presented. Accordingly, we dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted.").
[VOL. 9: 329, 2008] Victims and Promise of Remedies
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
neither ICJ decisions nor the President's Memorandum constituted a
federal law.' 22 The Texas court both refused to transplant the remedy
required by the ICJ decision into the national arena and refused to interpret
domestic law in light of the U.S.'s international obligations. Consequently,
on April 30, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the decision of the state court.1 23 The issue in this case is strictly within
the realm of national criminal remedies, so it is yet to be seen how the
Supreme Court will respond after having both closed and opened several
doors for granting national remedies.
124
The struggle of U.S. courts to adjust national remedies to its obligations,
either under the ICJ rulings or the Vienna Convention, has drawn an
extraordinary reaction from the academic community. Academics have
criticized the approach of the U.S. judiciary and argued for a judicial
dialogue between U.S. courts and the ICJ 12' or for a correct interpretation of
international obligations arising from the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations.' 
26
Consular cases, however, highlight the relevance of remedies for the
implementation of international law into domestic legal orders even
more than others. In consular cases, the problem reveals the dilemma.
The court must either to choose an adequate national remedy to
122. Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex: Crim. App. 2006).
123. Medellin v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 2129 (2007).
124. Though the questions presented before the U.S. Supreme Court do not directly
reveal the issue of remedies, the decision will certainly have a remedial effect if upheld
by the Court. Interestingly, questions are framed within the issue of the effect of ICJ
decisions, rather than the remedies under the Vienna Convention. Moreover, there is no
reference to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. See Medellin v. Texas, No.
06-984, 2007 WL 119139, at *v (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 2129
(2007) ("This case presents the following questions: 1. Did the President of the
United States act within his constitutional and statutory foreign affairs authority when
he determined that the states must comply with the United States' treaty obligation to
give effect to the Avena judgment in the cases of the 51 Mexican nationals named in the
judgment? 2. Are state courts bound by the Constitution to honor the undisputed
international obligation of the United States, under treaties duly ratified by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to give effect to the Avena judgment in the
cases that the judgment addressed?").
125. Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, From La Grand and Avena to Medellin-A
Rocky Road Toward Implementation, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 47 (2005) ("We
take this [Torres case] as the beginning of a fruitful judicial dialogue between U.S.
judges and the Hague Court.").
126. Luna & Sylvester, supra note 111, at 176 ("[A] near unanimous opinion
among scholars that the American judiciary's interpretation of the Vienna Convention is
fundamentally flawed.").
substitute for an international substantive remedy127 or create a new
remedy on the basis of treaty violations 128 which amounts fairly closely
to a direct implementation of the international remedy. 29 There are a
variety of remedies that have been ordered by international bodies, and
there is lack of consensus regarding the right of an individual to bring
direct claims for such remedies on an international level under general
international law. Additionally, there is difficulty in "translating" or
"transplanting" international remedies into national legal orders. As
such, one question may be
whether a judicially imposed remedy is appropriate, and if so, what that remedy
should be. Courts in the United States have sometimes asked this question, as in
the cases involving the Consular Convention, but they have not tried to
ascertain what remedy international law would impose. They should try to do
so.
130
However, the correct question might well be: how to find a remedy
which does not distort any of the legal regimes associated with it and
adequately remedies the harm of the victim himself.
127. See supra notes 102-05 (favoring interpretation of domestic statutes so as to
give effect to international remedies).
128. Carlos M. Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1159 (1992) ("When a state's primary obligation under a treaty is
an obligation to behave in a given way towards individuals, an additional default rule of
customary international law imposes an obligation on the parties to the treaty to afford
the individual a remedy domestically."); Kirgis, supra note 109, at 345 ("If, then, an
international law duty to provide restitution (or restoration of the status quo ante) for a
breach of an international obligation indeed applies when restitution is feasible under the
circumstances and would not be disproportionately burdensome, and if a municipal law
canon directs that a U.S. court should not place the United States in breach of its
international law duty unless Congress has unequivocally mandated otherwise, a
domestic court should order restitution as the usual remedy when a party with a real
stake in the matter has established that a violation of international law has occurred. It
would not matter whether the breached international obligation arose from custom or a
treaty."); Tomuschat, supra note 1, at 182 ("In this sense, after more than 200 years of
existence, the United States' ATCA may be viewed as a precursor of a development that
will mature in the coming decades. However, proceeding from the premises just
outlined, the 'new' claim to reparation would be founded on international, rather than on
domestic law."). See generally Valerie Epps, Violations of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations: Time for Remedies, 11 WILLAMETIE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 1, 27-28
(2004); Jeremy White, A New Remedy Stresses the Need for International Education: the
Impact of the Lagrand Case on a Domestic Court's Violations of a Foreign National's
Consular Relations Rights Under the Vienna Convention, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REv. 295, 311-12 (2003).
129. E.g., Torres v. Oklahoma, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
130. Kirgis, supra note 109, at 342.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Victims deserve remedy for harm suffered. Where there is no
customary rule providing victims with remedies under international law
and there are inconsistent responses by national courts in implementing
remedies, victims are placed in a quite unfavorable position. Furthermore,
this may be at odds with the trend of international courts in developing
remedial forms. Both the development of international remedies and the
fact that national courts rarely adopt adequate remedies leave victims
without satisfactory remedies. This is despite the fact that their victimhood
is the heart and substance of the cause of action pursued on the international
plane. Victims receive adequate remedies only in exceptional cases.
Additionally, the graver the violation, the less likely it is that victims
will be remedied. This is, in a way, the end result of the fragmentation of
remedies in international law. Therefore, more attention should be paid to
those victims who lose out in the redistribution of remedies, even though
their loss has been legally recognized as a cause of action as well as a
ground for expanding international jurisdiction. A more integrated approach
to remedies is necessary, if not already required by international law.
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